How to benchmark your deal against the market

You’re looking at a term sheet and wondering: is this a good deal? The spread seems high, but you’ve heard the market has tightened. Or the advance rate looks aggressive, but maybe that’s standard for your asset class. Without a benchmark, you’re negotiating blind.

This guide gives you the step-by-step process to benchmark your deal against the market. For the underlying analytical framework (discount margin, OAS, relative value concepts), see (Pricing and Relative Value).

1. Why you need to benchmark (and when not to)

When benchmarking matters most

Negotiating a new facility. You’re fielding term sheets and need to know which one represents fair value.
Evaluating competing offers. Two capital providers quote different structures. Which is actually cheaper?
Pricing a term ABS issuance. You need guidance spreads for your bookrunner and a sense of where the deal should land.
Annual facility reviews. Your existing facility is up for renewal. Has the market moved? Should you push for better terms?
Defending your pricing internally. Your CFO wants to know why you’re recommending one deal over another.

When benchmarking has limited value

Not every deal warrants a full benchmarking exercise.

Truly novel asset classes. If you’re financing music royalties or litigation claims, there may be fewer than five comparable transactions in existence. You’ll need to build from fundamentals rather than market comps.

Relationship-driven pricing. A bank providing a warehouse as part of a broader banking relationship isn’t pricing purely to market. The deposit relationship, cross-sell potential, and capital allocation rules drive the economics as much as comparable deals.

Distressed situations. If your current facility is in wind-down and you need replacement capital within 60 days, market benchmarks matter less than who’s willing to write the check.

What a benchmark tells you vs. what it doesn’t

A benchmark tells you whether your terms fall within the range of recent comparable transactions. It gives you evidence for negotiation and a sanity check on whether a deal is fair.

A benchmark doesn’t tell you whether you can actually achieve better terms. Your specific circumstances (track record, originator credit, data quality, relationship dynamics) may justify pricing inside or outside the benchmark range. Market data is the starting point, not the answer.

2. The step-by-step benchmarking process

Step 1: define what you’re pricing

Start by documenting the key terms of the deal you’re benchmarking.

Term	Your Deal	Notes
Structure	Warehouse facility
Asset class	Consumer unsecured loans	Prime/near-prime, avg FICO 720
Facility size	$75M	Uncommitted
Advance rate	80%	On eligible receivables
Spread	SOFR + 275 bps
Unused fee	50 bps	On undrawn commitment
Facility fee	1.0%	Upfront
Tenor	2 years	With 1-year extension option

You need these terms documented before you can find meaningful comps.

Step 2: identify your comp universe

Not all comps are created equal. Use this hierarchy:

Tier 1 (best comps): Same asset class, same structure, similar size, recent (within 6 months).

Tier 2: Same asset class, same structure, but different size or older vintage (6-18 months).

Tier 3: Adjacent asset class, same structure. A consumer unsecured warehouse comp is somewhat relevant for a BNPL warehouse, but requires adjustment.

Tier 4: Same asset class, different structure. A term ABS deal can inform warehouse pricing, but the comparison requires significant adjustment for structure differences.

For most deals, you want 3-5 Tier 1 or Tier 2 comps before drawing conclusions. If you can only find Tier 3 or Tier 4 comps, acknowledge the limitations.

Step 3: gather comp data

For each comp, you need:

Data Point	Why It Matters
Spread	Direct comparison
Advance rate	Affects leverage and cost of capital
Credit enhancement	For rated deals, comparable to advance rate
WAL / Tenor	Longer deals price wider
Rating	Investment grade vs. unrated
Size	Larger deals may price tighter
Pricing date	Market conditions at execution
Originator	Track record and credit quality

See Section 3 for where to find this data.

Step 4: adjust for differences

No two deals are identical. You’ll need to adjust comps to make them comparable. The key adjustments:

Advance rate. Higher advance = more leverage = should price wider
Credit quality. Better collateral = should price tighter
Size. Larger facilities = should price tighter
Timing. Older deals need adjustment for market moves
Structure. Term ABS vs. warehouse vs. forward flow aren’t directly comparable

See Section 5 for detailed adjustment methods.

Step 5: build the comp table

Present your comps in a table with your deal included for comparison.

Deal	Originator	Size	Advance	Spread	Date	Adjusted Spread
Your Deal	You	$75M	80%	S+275	Now	S+275
Comp A	[Name]	$100M	82%	S+250	3 mo ago	S+255
Comp B	[Name]	$50M	78%	S+285	4 mo ago	S+270
Comp C	[Name]	$75M	80%	S+260	2 mo ago	S+260
Comp D	[Name]	$150M	85%	S+225	6 mo ago	S+250

Illustrative pricing. See pricing disclaimer.

Include notes explaining your adjustments.

Step 6: draw conclusions

Based on the comp table above, where does your deal fall?

Inside market: Your deal is tighter than the adjusted comp range. Verify there’s no catch in the terms.
At market: Your deal is within the adjusted comp range. This is fair value.
Wide of market: Your deal is wider than comps. Identify why, then either negotiate, address the issue, or accept the premium.

In the example above, adjusted comps range from S+250 to S+270. Your deal at S+275 is 5-25 bps wide. That’s worth a conversation with your capital provider.

3. Where to find market data

Free and low-cost sources

EDGAR / SEC Filings

Public ABS issuers file documents that include pricing information.

Prospectus supplements: Filed within days of pricing, include final spreads and deal structure.
ABS-EE filings: Loan-level data for certain asset classes.
ABS-15G: Risk retention disclosures that confirm deal economics.

How to search: Go to SEC EDGAR, search by company name or use the full-text search for asset class terms.

Note: Search for your asset class + “prospectus supplement” to find recent public deals. For example: “consumer loan” + “prospectus supplement” + 2024.

TRACE

FINRA’s Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine provides secondary trading data for corporate bonds and ABS.

Limitations: Many ABF securities trade infrequently or not at all. TRACE is more useful for liquid benchmark ABS (auto, credit card) than for esoteric asset classes.

Rating Agency New Issue Reports

When a rating agency rates a deal, they publish a presale or new issue report that often includes:

Deal structure and enhancement levels
Spread guidance or final pricing (in some reports)
Comparative commentary on market context

These reports are free from S&P, Moody’s, Fitch, and KBRA on their respective websites.

Industry Publications

Asset Securitization Report: Weekly coverage of new issues and market trends.
Private Credit Investor: Covers private credit including ABF.
PeerIQ (now part of Cross River): Consumer lending market data.

Conference Presentations

SFIG Vegas, ABS East, and IMN conferences include market overview presentations with spread ranges. These are often published in conference materials or summarized in trade press.

Paid sources

Bloomberg

NI ABS: New issue database with pricing for public ABS.
BVAL: Evaluated pricing for secondary market.
LEAG: League tables showing market activity.

If you don’t have a Bloomberg terminal, your legal counsel, advisor, or capital provider may be able to pull specific data points.

Intex / Trepp

Deal structure and performance data for CMBS, CLOs, and ABS. Useful for comparing structural features and historical pricing.

Dealer Research

Active trading relationships provide access to weekly or monthly spread reports. These are the most current source of private market pricing but require a capital markets relationship.

Specialized Providers

Finsight: Private credit and ABF data
Creditflux: CLO and structured credit
KBRA data services: Enhanced rating agency data

Informal sources (often the most valuable)

Your Advisors and Counsel

Structured finance law firms see dozens of deals per quarter. They can’t share specific client economics, but they can provide ranges and directional guidance. Investment banks track private market pricing as part of their advisory business.

Peer Originators

Within antitrust constraints, peer conversations can provide market context. Industry working groups (SFIG committees, trade associations) create forums for this exchange.

Service Providers

Trustees, backup servicers, and calculation agents see deal economics across their client base. While they can’t share specifics, they can confirm whether terms are in the ballpark.

4. Building your comp set: what’s actually comparable

The comp hierarchy in practice

Tier 1: Direct Comps

A direct comp shares: same asset class, same structure, similar size (within 2x), recent vintage (within 6 months).

If you’re benchmarking a $75M consumer unsecured warehouse, a $100M consumer unsecured warehouse that priced 3 months ago is a direct comp.

Tier 2: Same-Asset-Class Comps

These share asset class and structure but differ on size or timing. A $200M consumer unsecured warehouse from 9 months ago is useful but requires adjustment.

Tier 3: Adjacent-Asset-Class Comps

Consumer unsecured and BNPL share some characteristics (short WAL, unsecured, consumer obligor). A BNPL warehouse comp can inform consumer unsecured pricing, but acknowledge the differences in credit performance and investor perception.

Tier 4: Different-Structure Comps

A consumer unsecured term ABS deal can provide a reference point for warehouse pricing, but the comparison requires significant adjustment. Term ABS prices tighter (matched funding, no mark-to-market risk), but the credit and collateral attributes are the same.

Why “close enough” comps can mislead you

A consumer unsecured warehouse and an equipment lease warehouse are both warehouses, but they’re not comparable without significant adjustment. Loss characteristics, WAL, investor base, and structural features differ materially.

Similarly, a deal from 2022 priced in a different rate environment. Even if spreads were similar, the base rate was hundreds of basis points lower. Adjust for market moves.

Minimum viable comp set

For directional guidance, you need 3-5 comps. This tells you whether your deal is roughly in the ballpark.

For a robust analysis (presenting to your board, using in negotiation), aim for 8-12 comps with adjustments documented.

If you can only find 1-2 comps, acknowledge the limitation. Your benchmark is suggestive, not definitive.

Worked example: building a comp set

Scenario: You’re benchmarking a $75M consumer unsecured warehouse, SOFR+275, 80% advance rate.

Search process:

EDGAR search for “consumer loan” + “warehouse” prospectus filings: 0 results (warehouses aren’t public)
Bloomberg NI ABS search for rated consumer unsecured ABS: 4 deals in past 6 months
Dealer research from your capital provider relationship: 3 warehouse data points
Conversation with counsel: confirms 2 additional data points (anonymized)
Industry conference presentation: market overview with spread ranges

Result: 9 data points total, of which 3 are direct warehouse comps, 4 are term ABS (Tier 4), and 2 are ranges from market commentary.

5. Adjusting for differences

5.1 Advance rate adjustment

Higher advance rate means more leverage, which means more risk to the capital provider, which should price wider.

The intuition: At 80% advance, the capital provider funds $80 of every $100 in collateral. At 85% advance, they fund $85. The extra $5 means less cushion against losses.

Worked Example

Deal	Advance Rate	Spread
Comp A	82%	SOFR + 250
Your Deal	80%	SOFR + 275

Illustrative pricing. See pricing disclaimer.

Comp A has a higher advance rate (82% vs. 80%), so all else equal, Comp A should price wider than your deal. But Comp A priced at S+250 while your deal is at S+275.

Adjustment: Each point of advance rate difference is worth approximately 5-10 bps in spread (this varies by asset class and market conditions).

Adjusting Comp A from 82% to 80%: S+250 - 10 bps = S+240 adjusted.

Your deal at S+275 is 35 bps wide of the adjusted comp.

Rule of Thumb Conversion

Advance Rate Delta	Spread Adjustment
1 point	5-10 bps
5 points	25-50 bps
10 points	50-100 bps

Illustrative pricing. See pricing disclaimer.

These are rough guidelines. The actual relationship depends on loss expectations and market conditions.

5.2 Credit quality adjustment

Better credit quality should price tighter. The challenge is quantifying “better.”

Factors to consider:

Average credit score (if applicable)
Historical loss rates vs. comp loss rates
Seasoning and vintage distribution
Originator track record

How to think about it:

If your portfolio has demonstrated 2% annual loss rates and the comp portfolio shows 3%, that 100 bps of better loss performance might justify 25-50 bps of tighter pricing.

But you need data to support the claim. “We think our portfolio is better” isn’t persuasive without loss curve comparisons.

5.3 Size adjustment

Larger facilities generally price tighter for two reasons:

Setup costs amortize across larger bases. Diligence, legal, and structuring costs are similar for a $50M and $200M deal.
Larger commitments are more valuable to capital providers. They can deploy more capital per relationship.

Typical adjustments:

Size Comparison	Spread Difference
$25M vs. $100M	25-50 bps
$100M vs. $250M	15-25 bps
$250M vs. $500M	10-15 bps
$500M+	Minimal additional benefit

Illustrative pricing. See pricing disclaimer.

If your deal is $75M and your best comp is $150M at S+225, add 15-25 bps to make the comp comparable to your size.

5.4 Timing/vintage adjustment

A comp from 12 months ago priced in a different market. You need to adjust for:

Base rate moves. If SOFR was 5.0% when the comp priced and is 4.5% now, spreads may have adjusted.
Risk appetite changes. Credit spreads tighten when capital is abundant and widen when it’s scarce.
Asset class sentiment. Specific events (a high-profile default, regulatory change) can move pricing for an asset class.

How to adjust:

Use an index as a proxy for market movement. The Bloomberg ABS Index or specific asset class indices (auto ABS, consumer ABS) track spread changes over time.

If the consumer ABS index has tightened 30 bps since your comp priced, adjust the comp 30 bps tighter.

Dealer research often provides this context directly: “Consumer warehouses have tightened 25-35 bps since Q1.”

5.5 Structure-specific adjustments

Term ABS vs. Warehouse

Term ABS generally prices 50-100 bps tighter than warehouse for the same asset class because:

Matched funding (no reinvestment risk for the investor)
No mark-to-market on unfunded commitments
Larger, more liquid investor base
Rating agency credit opinion

If your only comps are term ABS and you’re benchmarking a warehouse, add 50-100 bps to the term ABS spreads.

Rated vs. Unrated

A rated structure attracts a broader investor base and provides credit validation. Investment-grade rated tranches price 25-75 bps tighter than unrated structures of similar credit quality.

6. Worked examples by asset class

6.1 Consumer unsecured warehouse

Your deal:

$75M warehouse facility
Consumer unsecured loans, avg FICO 720
80% advance rate
SOFR + 275 bps
2-year term

Comp gathering:

Source	Data Points Found
Dealer research	2 warehouse deals (S+240, S+260)
Counsel intel	1 deal (S+255 range)
Public term ABS	3 deals (S+150 to S+175)

Comp table with adjustments:

Deal	Type	Size	Advance	Raw Spread	Size Adj	Adv Adj	Structure Adj	Adjusted
Your Deal	WH	$75M	80%	S+275	—	—	—	S+275
Comp A	WH	$100M	82%	S+240	+15	-10	—	S+245
Comp B	WH	$50M	78%	S+260	-15	+10	—	S+255
Comp C	WH	$125M	80%	S+255	+20	—	—	S+275
Comp D	Term	$300M	N/A	S+165	+10	N/A	+75	S+250

Illustrative pricing. See pricing disclaimer.

Conclusion: Adjusted comps range from S+245 to S+275. Your deal at S+275 is at the wide end but within market. A spread of S+250-260 would be more competitive. Worth pushing back in negotiation.

6.2 Equipment lease term ABS

Your deal:

$200M term ABS
Equipment leases (transportation focus)
Investment grade tranches, B-piece retained
Senior tranche: AAA, S+85
Mezzanine: A, S+150

Comp gathering:

Public equipment ABS issuance is available on EDGAR. Rating agency presales provide pricing context.

Deal	Issuer	Size	Senior	Mezz
Equipment Trust 2024-1	Major bank captive	$500M	S+75	S+135
Lessor ABS 2024-A	Regional lessor	$175M	S+95	S+165
Fleet Finance 2024-2	Fleet operator	$300M	S+82	S+145

Adjustments:

Size: Your deal at $200M is smaller than the bank captive ($500M), similar to regional lessor. Add 10 bps to bank captive comp.
Issuer quality: Bank captive has stronger parent support. Add 10-15 bps premium for standalone lessor.
Asset mix: Transportation equipment is mainstream. No adjustment needed vs. mixed equipment comps.

Conclusion: Adjusted comps suggest senior at S+85-95, mezz at S+150-165. Your pricing is in line with market.

6.3 Bridge loan warehouse

Your deal:

$100M warehouse
Residential bridge loans (fix-and-flip)
75% advance rate
SOFR + 350 bps

Challenge: Few public comps for bridge loan warehouses. CMBS and CRE CLO data provides some reference but requires significant adjustment.

Comp approach:

Search for bridge lender warehouse announcements in trade press (occasionally disclosed)
Adjust from CRE CLO spreads (bridge loans are a component)
Triangulate with counsel and advisor input

Available data:

Source	Data Point
Trade press	”Bridge lender closes $150M warehouse at SOFR+300-325” (9 months ago)
Counsel	”Bridge warehouses are pricing S+325-375 currently”
CRE CLO single-A	S+275 (add structural premium for warehouse)

Conclusion: Limited direct comps, but triangulation suggests S+325-375 range. Your deal at S+350 is in the middle of the range. If the 9-month-old comp priced at S+300-325, market may have widened slightly, making S+350 fair.

6.4 SBA forward flow

Your deal:

SBA 7(a) loan forward flow
95-97 premium (buying at 95-97% of par)
Servicing retained

Different analysis: SBA forward flows are priced as a premium to par, not a spread. The government guarantee changes the credit analysis.

Comp approach:

SBA premiums are tracked by specialist advisors and published in industry data. Premiums vary by:

Loan characteristics (size, rate, geography)
Servicing capability
Volume commitment

Market context:

Loan Type	Current Premium Range
Standard 7(a)	94-97%
SBA Express	92-95%
504 (secondary market)	Par to 101%

Conclusion: Your premium of 95-97% is within market for standard 7(a). Pushing toward 97%+ requires either stronger servicing track record, larger volume commitment, or preferred loan characteristics.

7. What to do when you can’t find good comps

When this happens

Some deals genuinely lack comparable transactions:

Emerging asset classes. Litigation finance, pharma royalties, insurance-linked securities have limited deal history.
Unusual structures. Bespoke participations, hybrid instruments, or novel features.
First-time originators. No track record means limited ability to benchmark against established players.

Approach 1: build from fundamentals

When comps don’t exist, work backward from what the capital provider needs.

Framework:

Capital provider's return requirement
= Cost of funds (their financing cost)
+ Credit spread (loss expectation + risk premium)
+ Operational cost (diligence, monitoring, servicing oversight)
+ Profit margin

Worked example: A credit fund financing litigation claims

Component	Estimate	Rationale
Fund cost of capital	10%	LP return target for private credit
Credit loss expectation	3-5%	Based on portfolio modeling
Operational overhead	1-2%	Specialized diligence requirements
Target return premium	2-3%	For novel asset class
Implied pricing floor	16-20%	Expressed as yield on funded amount

This gives you a fundamentals-based floor for negotiation.

Approach 2: adjacent comps with explicit adjustments

If you can’t find direct comps, use adjacent ones and document your reasoning.

Example: Pricing a music royalty warehouse

No direct comps exist, but:

Film slate financing prices at SOFR + 400-500
Content rights securitization prices at SOFR + 300-400
Whole business securitization (which shares some characteristics) prices at SOFR + 250-350

Adjustment logic:

Music royalties have more predictable cash flows than film slate (catalog has decades of history), but less diversification than whole business (concentrated rights).

Estimated range: SOFR + 350-450

Approach 3: run a competitive process

Let the market tell you where you price.

If you approach 4-5 capital providers and receive term sheets, the range of offers reveals market pricing. This is the most reliable benchmark when traditional comps don’t exist.

Process:

Prepare a clean data room and investment summary
Approach 4-6 potential capital providers
Request indicative terms within 3-4 weeks
Compare offers across economic terms
The range of responses = the market

The “no comps” premium

First movers in an asset class typically pay a premium of 25-75 bps over where the market will settle once more deals are done.

This premium reflects:

Capital provider’s additional diligence cost
Uncertainty about collateral performance
Lack of secondary market or exit optionality
Reputational risk of being associated with a failed asset class

The premium shrinks as the asset class matures and more transactions create precedent.

8. Using benchmarks in negotiation

How to present your analysis

Lead with the comp table, not your conclusion.

Effective: “We’ve analyzed five comparable warehouse facilities that priced in the last six months. Adjusting for size and advance rate differences, the range is SOFR+240 to SOFR+265. Our term sheet is at SOFR+290. Can you help us understand what’s driving the difference?”

Less effective: “We think SOFR+290 is too high. We want SOFR+250.”

The first approach invites dialogue. The second creates confrontation.

When benchmarks strengthen your position

Your term sheet is wide of market:

“Based on these four comparable transactions, adjusting for our smaller size, we believe fair value is in the SOFR+255-265 range. Our current term sheet is at SOFR+290. Is there something about our profile that explains the premium, or is there room to revisit pricing?”

Annual repricing conversation:

“Since we closed 12 months ago, the ABS index has tightened 40 bps and we’ve seen comparable warehouses price 30-35 bps tighter. Our facility is currently at SOFR+275. Based on market movement and our strong performance, we’d like to discuss repricing to SOFR+240-245.”

When benchmarks have limited leverage

Benchmarks don’t help when:

You’re a new originator with no track record. The capital provider is pricing execution risk, not just credit risk.
The capital provider has proprietary reasons. Their internal capital allocation, concentration limits, or relationship strategy may drive pricing independent of market.
You need the deal more than they do. If you’re in distress or have no alternatives, market benchmarks don’t create negotiating leverage.

The conversation framework

"Based on [X] comparable transactions..."
"Adjusting for [specific differences: size, advance rate, timing]..."
"We believe fair value is in the range of [spread range]..."
"Can you help us understand what would need to be true for us to achieve [target terms]?"

The last question is key. It shifts from “your pricing is wrong” to “help us earn better terms.”

Avoiding negotiation mistakes

Don’t bluff with comps you can’t substantiate. If you cite a deal at SOFR+220 and the capital provider knows it was actually SOFR+280, you’ve lost credibility.

Don’t ignore legitimate reasons for premium pricing. If you’re a first-time originator with 6 months of data, you deserve to price wide of an established platform with 5 years of track record.

Don’t treat benchmarking as adversarial. The goal is to reach fair terms, not to “win” against your capital provider. You’ll work with them for years.

9. When your deal is off-market (and what to do about it)

9.1 Your deal prices wide of market

First, diagnose why.

Legitimate reasons (address the underlying issue):

Driver	What It Means	What to Do
Originator credit risk	Your balance sheet or management raises concerns	Improve financial position, provide more transparency
Limited track record	Not enough performance data	Accept premium, negotiate step-down as data builds
Data quality issues	Tape has gaps, inconsistencies	Fix the data, demonstrate improvement
Operational concerns	Servicing, collections, compliance questions	Address diligence findings
Concentration risk	Geographic, obligor, or product concentration	Diversify portfolio or accept structural mitigation

Questionable reasons (push back):

Driver	What It Might Mean	What to Do
Stale pricing	Desk hasn’t updated models	Share current market data
Capital constraints	Internal allocation issues	Ask if timing or size would help
Relationship leverage	They know you have limited options	Run a competitive process

Your options:

Address the underlying issue. If it’s fixable (data quality, financial disclosure), fix it and revisit.
Accept the premium. If the issue is legitimate (track record), take the deal and negotiate a step-down as you build history.
Walk away. If you have alternatives and the premium isn’t justified, go elsewhere.
Run a competitive process. Multiple term sheets reveal whether the pricing is market or relationship-specific.

9.2 Your deal prices tight of market

This happens. Before celebrating, verify there’s no catch.

Why you might price tight:

Strong originator track record and relationship
Strategic importance to the capital provider (they want to grow the relationship)
Competitive pressure during a process
Capital provider has a cost of funds advantage

What to watch for:

Terms that claw back economics elsewhere. A low spread with aggressive triggers, high fees, or tight covenants may not be a good deal.
Uncommitted capacity. A great spread on uncommitted facility means the capital provider can walk away.
Relationship expectations. Cross-sell requirements, deposit obligations, or exclusivity provisions extract value elsewhere.

The question to ask: “This pricing is tighter than we expected based on market comps. What’s driving that?” Usually there’s a good answer (they want the relationship, you have a strong track record). Occasionally there’s a catch.

10. Keeping your benchmarks current

Ongoing monitoring cadence

Quarterly: Informal market checks. Review trade press, check in with counsel or advisors, note any new data points.

Annually: Formal benchmarking before facility maturity or renewal. Build a fresh comp table, document market movements, prepare for repricing conversation.

Opportunistically: When market moves significantly (rate environment change, credit event, regulatory shift), update your benchmark.

Building your benchmark database

Track every data point you gather, even if it’s imperfect.

Date	Asset Class	Structure	Size	Spread	Advance	Source	Notes
2024-03	Consumer	WH	$100M	S+245	82%	Dealer	Named issuer
2024-04	Consumer	Term	$250M	S+160	N/A	EDGAR	Prospectus supp
2024-05	Consumer	WH	$75M	S+255-265	78-80%	Counsel	Range estimate

Illustrative pricing. See pricing disclaimer.

Over time, this database becomes your proprietary market intelligence.

Using benchmarks proactively

Don’t wait for renewal to use your benchmarks.

“We’ve noticed market spreads have tightened 35 bps since we closed. Given our strong performance (12 months, no losses, full utilization), we’d like to discuss repricing.”

This positions you as informed and professional. It also gives your capital provider an opportunity to reward good performance before you start shopping the facility.

Cross-references

Pricing and Relative Value: Underlying analytical framework, spread concepts (DM, OAS, Z-spread), total cost of capital methodology
Market Spreads Guide: Current market spread levels by asset class
Market Data and Public Datasets: Detailed guide to EDGAR, TRACE, Bloomberg, and other data sources
Economics for Originators: How benchmark pricing flows into all-in cost of capital
Negotiation Strategy: Using benchmarks effectively in deal negotiations